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TAXATION: DOUBLE TAXATION OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL
PROPERTY USED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952)
Ohio, the domiciliary state of plaintiff corporation, levied an ad
valorem personal property tax on the full value of its vessels used in
interstate commerce on inland waterways. The vessels, almost continuously outside Ohio during the taxable year, traveled a maximum
of 17% miles on waterways bordering the state and neither picked up
nor discharged cargo there. They were not taxed on any portion of
their value by any state other than Ohio. After the Ohio Board of
Tax Appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio sustained the tax,'
plaintiff appealed on the ground that the tax violated the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. HELD, the domiciliary state
may not levy such a tax on the full value of the corporation's vessels
engaged in interstate commerce on inland waterways if they are outside the state long enough to render them taxable elsewhere.
The decision purports to be, finally, an answer by the Supreme
Court to the question of whether double taxation of inland water
transportation moving in interstate commerce is permissible. Early
cases overruled the possibility of a tax by the nondomiciliary state
when it alone was attempting to tax and when both it and the domiciliary state were attempting to tax, because of the temporary nature
of the actual situs of the property.2 The possibility of double taxation
was recognized in the latter instance, but the question was not
answered. 3
The later case of Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania4 established that a tax might be levied by a nondomiciliary state on
the valuation of the amount of movable tangible property continually
and constantly used within the state even though no particular
property remained in the state long enough to acquire a permanent
situs, the theory being that the state could tax the owner for protection received under its laws. This principle, however, was held

'Standard Oil Co.

v. Glander, 155 Ohio St. 61, 98 N.E.2d 8 (1951).
2Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471 (U.S. 1872); Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 17
How. 596 (U.S. 1854); St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423 (U.S. 1870).
3lbid.

4141 U.S. 18 (1891).
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5
not applicable to water transportation. The possibility of taxation
6
by the domiciliary state of the owner was not considered.
Subsequently the court allowed the nondomiciliary state to tax
vessels engaged in interstate commerce when situated wholly in that
state throughout the year, 7 but omitted mention of the possibility
8
of double taxation. The maxim mobilia sequuntur personam was
applied in allowing the domiciliary state to tax vessels which had not
acquired any other taxable situs even though the vessels had not been
in the state.9 Then came the inland water transportation case of Ott
v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co.,'0 which allowed a tax by a nondomiciliary state using as a basis of assessment the number of miles the
corporation's barges traveled within the state compared to the total
number of miles traveled by all its barges everywhere. The resulting
ratio was then applied to the total capital stock of the corporation
and a taxable base was obtained.
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky,'1 dealing with the
possibility of double taxation in regard to land transportation, held
that the domiciliary state could not tax the full value of all railroad
cars of the company because some had acquired a permanent taxable situs outside the state, though no nondomiciliary states were
taxing. In the determination of the number of cars having a permanent situs in the state it was necessary to compute the proportion of
the corporation's cars shown to be used in the state under a system
of averages set up by the state and based upon the gross earnings of
the corporation.
In contrast, double taxation apparently will be allowed as to air
and ocean transportation. 12 Due to the very natures of these respective types of travel, it is virtually impossible for an average number
of units to acquire a taxable situs in any one state through use of
an apportionment rule. Unless the domiciliary state is allowed to

5ld. at 26.
GSee Id. at 30 for Justice Bradley's dissent, which states that the law allowing
double taxation on tangible personal property is unquestionable.
701d Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905).
8STORY, CONFLicr OF LAWS §378 (5th ed. 1857). "Movables follow the [law
of the] body
OSouthern
10336 U.S.
"2199 US.

or person of the owner."
Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 US. 63 (1911).
169 (1949).

194 (1905).
12Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944); Southern Pac.

Co. v.Kentucky, 222 US. 63 (1911).
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tax all units of such commerce belonging to a corporation in its state,
many of the units may escape taxation.
The instant case seems to establish the principle that there is to
be no double taxation of tangible property used in inland waterways
in interstate commerce. This rule applies to tangibles used in interstate commerce on land in cases in which the property is "permanently"
outside the domiciliary state. 1" But, as stated, it probably will not
be applied in cases pertaining to air and ocean transportation. Unless
it is shown that no distinction exists between intangible and tangible
personal property14 in regard to double taxation, the instant case will
have a profound effect on revenue derived by domiciliary states from
tangible personal property engaged in interstate commerce. Even
if no other state is taxing the property, as long as a taxable situs
can be established in other states the domiciliary state must disregard
the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam and base taxes levied on
the property on some equitable formula of apportionment determined
by the number of miles the taxable units travel in the domiciliary
state, which may be none at all, as compared with the total number of
miles traveled in all states.
W. WILLIAM ELLSWORTH, JR.

"Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
14For the trend in allowing both the domiciliary state of the owner and the
state where the property is located to tax intangible personal property, see State
Tax Comm'n of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942); Curry v. McCanless, 307
U.S. 357 (1939); Pearson v. McGraw, 308 U.S. 313 (1939).
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